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On Review:
The Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise
History of the Supreme Court of the
United States, Volume 1,
Antecedents and Beginnings to 1801
By Julius Goebel, Jr.

The MacMillan Company, New York: 1971.
Pp. 864, includi•ng index.

Reviewed by David S. Bogen

Editor's Note: After receiving his LL.B. from
Harvard, Professor Bogen clerked for Justice
Jacob Spiegel of the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court. He then received an Arthur
Garfield Hays Civil Liberties Fellowship to
New York University Law School, where he
earned his LL.M. He spent two years in New
York as an associate in a large firm before he
came to the University of Maryland School of
Law where he is now an Associate Professor.
More than half a century ago, the ideal education was "classical education." French
and Latin became so much a part of the student's intellectual equipment that they provided
the natural idioms for expressing thoughts precisely. Another hallmark of such an education
was an impressive vocabulary of words found
only in the unabridged version of the dictionary. Procedural minutiae that drug with sleep
less hardy souls stimulate the classicist to probe
deeper the institutions involved. Professor
Goebel's volume of the Holmes Devise History
of the Supreme Court is a stunning display of

such classical erudition. Thus, it may be forbidding to those educated in a different mold.
Its assumption of large chunks of English and
American history as common knowledge may
similarly reduce its readership. This is a shame,
for every American lawyer should have and
read the Holmes Devise volumes in order to
understand the system within which he or she
works.
Despite its intimidating aspect, the classical
tradition contains timeless virtues. One virtue
is the scholarship shown in the patient search
through mounds of paper for small bits of significance. In such a way, Professor Goebel
traces the procedures for initiating legal actions
and for securing review of decisions in England
and in each of the States. He then is able to
demonstrate what each State's law contributed
to the Judiciary Act of 1789 and the Process
Acts of 1789, 1792, and 1793, and to give some
idea of the divergencies in practice between the
States which the federal acts carried into the
new federal system.
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Professor Goebel's classical style of writing
is often enlivened by his literary wit and grace.
Referring to the large body of prize cases involving treaties with France, he writes "These
were problems that blew in from the sea, so
to speak, precipitated by war and by the prompt
commitment of the United States to a policy
of neutrality." 1 A prize case which dragged out
over more than a decade is pictured as "the
barnacled litigation." 2 These images may carry
the modern reader through many of the travails that Professor Goebel's erudition causes.
While each of the succeeding volumes of the
Holmes Devise spans less than three decades of
Supreme Court history, this first volume traverses centurie~from Coke's England in the
sixteenth century3 to the Supreme Court as it
delivered its opinions at the opening of the
nineteenth century.4 In addition, Professor
Goebel deals with the jurisprudence of a great
number of jurisdiction~both England and

The thrust of Professor
Goebel's volume is ••• o·n
the intellectual history
of the Court ...

each individual State-to show how the institutions and procedures of each jurisdiction
were incorporated or rejected in establishing
the federal judicial system. This sweep has resulted in a tendency to summarize records and
cases rather than letting the characters speak
for themselves. Personalities thus remain misty
and vague. A better portrait of the judges and
the circumstances of their appointment may be
found in briefer works. 5 The thrust of Professor Goebel's volume is instead on the intellectual history of the Court-the idea.s, events.,
statutes and prior cases from which the Court's
own processes and decisions were drawn.
One major theme of this volume is the background of judicial review for constitutionality.
Professor Goebel does a meticulous job of setting forth the English precedents for reviewing
colonial legislation. The notion that a law of
the local lawmaking body might be voided by
some other body was thus a familiar one to the
78

citizens of the new nation. But Professor Goebel
is not wholly successful in proving that these
precedents were the source of our concept of
constitutional review by a court. 6 The Privy
Council was not an ide·al institution to colonists
who found that their laws were dis.rupted and
could be struck down because thought to be
unwise rather than simply contrary to charter.
Professor Goebel does demonstrate that,
whatever its source, judicial review for constitutionality was well accepted prior to Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison. 7 Justices
Wilsons, Ellsworth9 and Chase10 had all expressed the idea that the Court should declare
laws unconstitutional in a proper case. The justices individually on circuit had already pre..
sented remonstrances to the President to the
effect that the Pension Act imposing duties on
them was not constitutionally authorized; Wilson and Blair refused to perform any duties
under it. 11 Several State laws had been declared
unconstitutional by Supreme Court justices sitting on the Circuit Courts12 and the full Court
sustained the constitutionality of at least two
statutes without even questioning the propriety
of engaging in constitutional review. 13 That
the first statement of the principle in a holding of the full Court awaited Marshall's ascent
to the Chief Justiceship is, therefore, merely
an accident of litigation.
Much of Goebel's volume discusses the history of the establishment of the Court, its background in English law, the debates over it at
the Constitutional Convention and the drafting
of the Acts regulating its procedures. Of the
remaining portion of the book, nearly as much
space is devoted to the business of the Circuit
Courts as to the decisions of the early Court.
To bring the new Court closer to the people,
Congress had established Circuit Courts consisting of two Supreme Court justices sitting
with one District Court judge. Not only did
these Circuit Courts have appellate status over
the District Courts, but they had an extensive
original jurisdiction as well. Meanwhile, the
full Court had to wait until these cases had
been decided before it had any significant business of its own. During the first three years
of the Court's existence, the Terms of the Court
were essentially formal rituals with no cases
ready for the Court to hear. The greatest portion of the Justices' time was thus spent riding
circuit, a fact which deterred several men from
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seeking the office and was bemoaned by almost
all who were required to do it.
The largest single group of cases before the
Supreme Court in this early period were prize
decisions concerning shipping captured by privateers and brought into American ports. Professor Goebel carefully traces the antecedents
of these cases from English courts through
State courts and the Continental Congress'
Committee on Prize Appeals. 14 He shows how
carefully and well the Supreme Court decided
the prize cases before it, rejecting the legality
of consular prize courts, 15 scrupulously enforcing the neutrality laws which prevented
privateering by American citizens or American
ships,16 but allowing French privateers to keep
their prey although those privateers had repairs done in American ports.U Prize appeals
today are, hopefully, of little relevance to our
pressing legal problems. They are, however, of
historical interest with respect to incidental
problems of procedure and citizenship laws,
and they indicate how well the fledgling institution was performing.
The performance of this Court in one case
still reverberates today. Mr. Chisholm brought
suit claiming that his decedent had delivered
goods to the state of Georgia for which payment was not made. Jurisdiction was claimed
under Article III which extends the judicial
power to "Controversies . . . between a State
and Citizens of another State." The debates in
the Convention shed little light on whether
States retained immunity from private suits as
Georgia claimed. Alexander Hamilton in The
Federalist Papers attempted to allay State fears
by arguing that any federal judgment on a debt
owed by a State could not be enforced short of
war. 18 Meanwhile Madison, one of the most
active men in the framing of the Constitution,
stated at the Virginia Ratification Convention
that controversies between a State and citizens
of another State could only exist where the
State was the plaintiff or where it had consented to be sued.19 But the language of the
Constitution made no specific reference to
State sovereign immunity. The jurisdictional
language of Article III in particular made no
distinction between suits where the State consented and those where it did not. Justice
Iredell found that Congress had net passed any
legislation authorizing such a private suit in
1974

assumpsit; but the other four justices thought
general procedural statutory language was sufficient to permit this suit, and, following the
plain meaning of the document, agreed that
States were subject to suit.
This case received the greatest criticism of
any decision made prior to the ascent of John
Marshall to the Chief Justiceship. Indeed, it
provoked the Eleventh Amendment, which prohibited suits against a State by citizens of
another State. Yet surely no State feared paying the bills for goods which it had purchased.
Consent to such a suit in State Courts is today
almost automatic since suppliers would be chary
of a buyer who could keep the goods and refuse
payment leaving the supplier no legal recourse.
Thus Georgia was not frightened at the notion
of paying Chisholm, but the States could foresee later cases where sharp differences might
arise over whether debts for huge sums were
properly owing. Many States had passed laws
confiscating British property during the revolution. Such laws would be upheld by the State
courts, but the States could not be so certain
of the result in federal courts. 20 The States
were not willing at this time to place themselves
so completely at the mercy of the Union. The
notions of state sovereignty so fearfully put at
hazard in Philadelphia21 were too strong to
allow federal control if it was not strictly necessary for the preservation of an effective
nation. However worthy such suits might be
to attain individual justice, they were hardly
indispensable to the functioning of the nation.
In fact, the Constitution at this time did not
protect individual rights against the States to
a significant degree. To hold this nation together, the Court could still mediate conflicts
between the States. That was enough for then.
We have come a very long distance from
those early days. The effective administration
of a modern nation has greatly reduced the
power of States as separate entities. The Fourteenth Amendment has given significant protection to the individual against the State. The
Eleventh Amendment looks in this context anachronistic. After Ex Parte Young 22 which permitted suits enjoining state officials from acting in an unconstitutional manner, the Eleventh Amendment's effect has been only a partial
protection of State treasuries. Meanwhile the
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size of those treasuries depends more on decisions made in Washington, D. C., than on any
immunity from private suits.
Marshall's great decisions helped nationalize
the country and increased the power and influence of the Court, but only a decade earlier the
decision· in Chisholm had provoked a reaction
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which increased local autonomy and weakened
the Court. It was necessary to exist awhile as
a nation before we could trust ourselves in this
new situation. For Marshall, as it is for us,
"The readiness is all." 28 In Professor Goebel's
volume we find the strands traced which made
the time ready for John Marshall.

and Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dallas) 385 (1798), discussed in GoEBEL, supra note 1, at 782-784.
•• GoEBEL, supra note 1, at 147-195.
uld. at 760-765.
•• Id. at 770-776.
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lllJd. at 317; THE FEDERALIST No. 81 at 548-549
(Cook, ed. 1961). The implication being that, practically, there was no need to worry since no federal
government would be stupid enough to attempt enforcement.
10
GOEBEL, supra note 1, at 385; ELLIOT, DEBATES IN
THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS Ill at 532.
""See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304 (1816) •.
21
Professor Goebel's focus on the structure of the
judiciary makes his discussion of the Constitutional
Convention seem like atrending a feast with a muzzle.
One loses the impulses which later become critical to
constitutional decisions.
·
.
.. 209 u.s. 123 (1908).
" Shakespeare, Hamlet, Act v; Scene 2.
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